THE turmoil in Ukraine in recent weeks, heightened by Russia’s dispatching of military forces to Crimea, has prompted predictable cries of outrage from right-wing American politicians accusing US President Obama of “weakness” for not responding more forcefully.

My reaction is more mixed. While I think Russian President Putin’s decision to send forces into Crimea introduced unnecessary risks, I also share the Russian perspective that recent developments in the Ukraine appear to be outside the law.

Just a couple of weeks ago, Russia participated with other European representatives in brokering a layered agreement between representatives of protestors in Kiev and Ukraine’s president, Mr Yanukovich. (Russia had for some time been expressing its concern that many of the street protestors represented far-right nationalists who in no way represented the sentiments of the peoples of eastern and southern Ukraine.)

This agreement allowed Mr Yanukovich to remain in power, but also contained many reform measures, including holding an election for the presidency before 2014 ended. Only a few days later, however, this arrangement collapsed and the president fled the capital. It is important to remember that it was not Mr Yanukovich who reneged on the agreement.

Russian President Mr. Putin alleges that this was clearly an instance of “mob rule,” and that the subsequent deposition of Mr Yanukovich lacked legal standing. Concurrently, many citizens of the eastern and southern portions of Ukraine began calling for Russian assistance to counter this usurpation of power.

Unfortunately, rather than joining Mr Putin in calling for a return to the terms of the brokered agreement, Western nations welcomed the turn of events by acknowledging the legitimacy of the new government in Kiev and the deposition of Mr Yanukovich. I suspect that if it had been President Yanukovich who had broken the agreement, the West’s reaction would have been quite different.

This, coupled with America’s lecturing Russia about violating international law by invading another country — despite America’s invasions and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — had to have struck Mr Putin as the height of hypocrisy.

In international affairs, memories are long and perceived, unresolved slights can fester. One does not have to be a defender of Mr Putin to understand that — from Russia’s point of view — this incident is yet another instance where the United States and other Western powers have behaved as if Russia’s concerns were, at best, of secondary importance.

Following the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, Russian leaders believe they received what they thought was a firm promise that NATO would not expand eastward to welcome as member states former members of the Soviet Union.

As recently as 2009, former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev angrily repeated the charge that the West had broken its promise. While Mr Medvedev’s recollection of events may not be correct in every detail, some of the key players involved at the time thought that, indeed, just such a promise had been made. (See “NATO’s Eastward Expansion: Did the West Break Its Promise to Moscow,” Der Spiegel, November 26, 2009.)

Furthermore, when the United States announced that it would station in Poland missiles capable of intercepting any warheads that might be launched from Iran, Russia objected that this system could also be used against Russia’s missile force. While the United States acknowledged this concern, it neither partnered with Russia for an alternative solution nor canceled its deployment plans. 

History and Russian memories

The Ukrainian and Russian peoples’ cultural and historical ties are complex, having begun over a thousand years ago with a grouping of Slavic peoples organized as the Kievan Rus’, the precursor to the nation of Russia.

A good part of what is modern Ukraine was this peoples’ homeland. By the 16th and 17th centuries, however, the cultural divide between the western portion of Ukraine — seeking closer ties with the West — and the eastern and southern portions — with historically closer ties to Russia — had already developed.

Ukraine became part of the Soviet Union in 1922 as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. During the chaos of World War II, many Ukrainians fought against both the Nazis and the Soviets in a desperate struggle for national independence. In 1945, those efforts having failed, the Ukrainian SSR was one of the founding members of the United Nations; it remained part of the Soviet Union until the latter’s dissolution in 1991.

One of Stalin’s key concerns following World War II was to make certain that neighboring countries through which the West had twice invaded Russia — France in 1812 and Germany in 1941 — were dependably allied with Russia.

In truth, why should Russia be any more passive in this respect than the United States? Other nations certainly remember the Monroe Doctrine of 1923, when the American president essentially told the rest of the world to keep its hands off the entire Western Hemisphere.

And, as the United States gained in economic and military power, it became even more aggressive in asserting its right to ensure that countries in its hemisphere were friendly to it.

As recently as the early 1960s the US and Russia came to the brink of nuclear war because of Russian missiles in Cuba and, in the 1970s America funded the Contra forces warring against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas.

My point here is not that past American violations of international law warrant similar behavior by other states today but, rather, that knowledge of our past ought to infuse America’s diplomatic efforts with greater wisdom and a generous heaping of humility.

What is the best outcome we can hope for in Ukraine? Well, for one thing, we can all celebrate the remarkable fact that, so far at least, this has been a bloodless confrontation. Praise to all involved!

Moving forward, the West should take every opportunity to reassure Russia — and remind Ukraine’s leadership — that the West respects and supports Ukraine’s special relationship with Russia.

This should not be an “either/or” tug of war between Russia and the West. There is every reason for all parties involved to celebrate the many diverse cultures and their histories in the Ukraine. Greater Europe (including Russia) is richer for it.

But there may have to be some political changes. For instance, the Ukraine could adopt a more federal structure, allowing greater autonomy of, and representation to, its various regions. Nonetheless, if the citizens of Crimea, for instance, vote to secede from Ukraine and petition to be annexed by Russia, the Ukrainian leadership may well have to choose between swallowing hard and allowing it, or initiating military force to attempt to stop it.

I do not pretend to know what the wisest option might be. Of this I am certain, however: Only the slow, laborious process of seeking mutual respect, understanding, and the pursuit of collective self-interest holds the promise of breaking the cycle of rivalry, anger and recrimination.

And this process can best be facilitated if all parties would truly work for solutions that would best honor the interests of both Ukraine and Russia.

I have noticed that China’s government has called for restraint and consultation on all sides. Perhaps China could offer her services as just the kind of “honest broker” this situation needs. This is one of the heavy burdens that nations with world power status must occasionally assume.

The author has been a college teacher of American history and political science and the director of the US National Catholic Rural Life Conference. He was a member of the Iowa State House of Representatives and retired from public service in the Iowa executive branch in 2004. Shanghai Daily condensed his article.

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